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This article analyses how, through adopting responsibility for their co-workers’ livelihoods,
workplace-based unionists shaped Zambian mining capitalism. I argue that union branch executives
learnt that they could best assist their co-workers through offering them financial services and through
co-operation with company HR. During wage negotiations, unionists drew strength from this
understanding, encouraging them to see ever-decreasing salaries as market-driven, and discouraging
the militancy that has on occasion raised wages. Building upon the anthropology of trade unionism, I
detail how tangible solidarities within a workplace shape unions’ ethical-political projects; and argue
that subjectivation through union ideologies can discourage scrutiny of structural injustice. Linking
anthropology that explores capitalism through relationships and moral norms to liberalized capital’s
disempowerment of unions, I claim that unionists’ moral, technical, and physical labour mitigated, yet
inadvertently enabled, worsening working conditions.
In December 2017, Joseph, Richard,1 and I were examining financial records stolen
from Mopani Copper Mines (MCM), a Zambian Glencore subsidiary. Joseph and
Richardwere employed byMCMasminers and volunteered as union branch executives.
Mopani renegotiated wages with the unions annually, and Joseph hoped to use these
records to demonstrate thatMCMcould afford a significant pay rise. Fearing retribution
against theminerwho had stolen the records, Josephwould only use them to triangulate
data obtained legally: workers counting trucks leaving the mine-site, production
numbers provided by sympathetic line-managers, and Glencore’s semi-annual financial
reports. Seemingly strengthening the unionists’ position, the global copper price had
recently hit a four-year high.
When the Mineworkers Union of Zambia’s (MUZ) President presented Joseph’s
arguments to Mopani, its HR officer claimed that the mine was not profitable. MCM
had supposedly been buying copper from an entrepreneur in the Congo and was
counterintuitively disadvantaged by the increased copper price. That night, Richard
drove across the Zambia-Congo border, searching unsuccessfully for the entrepreneur
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to scrutinize this claim. Wage negotiations continued for three months. Each evening,
the branch executives formedmoral and technical arguments from data aboutMopani’s
health, the copper industry, and the cost of living. These were delivered by MUZ’s
President and rebutted by Mopani’s HR. Management’s responses frequently appeared
dubious: when explaining why Mopani could not afford funeral insurance, HR mis-
converted kwacha to USD, increasing costs tenfold. At each day’s end, MUZ’s President
obtained the branch executives’ reluctant agreement to reduce the pay increment
demanded and HR occasionally increased MCM’s offer.
After two months, the pay raise commanded by the unionists had fallen from
35 per cent to 12 per cent and Mopani had increased its offer from 0 per cent to 4 per
cent. Management told the branch executives to update miners on the negotiations.
(Union policy disallowed discussing negotiations without HR’s permission.) Joseph,
Richard, and Kanda, another MCM branch executive, briefed members. Outraged
workers told Kanda that they knewMCMwasmakingmoney and bemoaned that once-
proud miners were now ‘like beggars’. Kanda replied that Mopani was not profitable
and repeated the financial statistics HR had utilized during their negotiations. Tensions
slowed production. Joseph and Kanda implored miners to work harder, arguing that
profits would enable MCM to increase salaries.
Between 2016 and 2019, I conducted eleven months of ethnography on Zambia’s
Copperbelt, living with Kanda and working fromMUZ’s offices. Long-term immersion
allowed many conversations with Joseph and Kanda, and I came to understand that,
despite the inconsistencies between the stolen financial records and management’s
spurious data, they genuinely believed that their wage agreements were fair andmarket-
driven. In the negotiation’s final weeks, Kanda began complaining that miners needed
to ‘appreciate that the company has many worries’. When they agreed upon a 7 per
cent pay raise (their third below-inflation increment in five years), he messaged me
to articulate how proud he was of both the unionists and management. Kanda knew
that his co-workers’ lives were becoming harder and he planned to provide miners with
financial training and expand their access to union-affiliated bank loans. This would
enable increasingly poor workers to maintain their middle-class identity:2 renting a
home, paying school fees, and supporting rural kin. Joseph believed that a strike or go-
slow may have raised wages; however, he would have felt responsible for any workers
fired after industrial action and he feared that overly generous salaries could cause
MCM to close. He explained:
I would say it [7 per cent] is a good thing to me because I don’t have anyone complaining that I made
them lose their jobs … I wouldn’t want anyone to lose employment because I know how people are
suffering on the Copperbelt. So I would rather sacrifice their increments, so that I know that I have
maintained their job.
Joseph (and unionists everywhere – Botiveau 2017: 95) experienced a tension between
maintaining employment levels and increasing salaries. This dichotomy has often gone
unscrutinized by anthropologists, who have sympathized with professional unionists’
frustrations about workers’ unreasonable expectations (Lazar 2017: 117). In Zambia,
such analysis would be incomplete: almost every mine offered salary increments of
between 0 per cent and the inflation rate, yet currency devaluation reduced wage
bills and several operations made annual profits of above 100 million USD (CNMCL
2017; FQM 2017). I show instead that during wage negotiations, Joseph drew upon
union training and discourses; these inadvertently encouraged him to accept a false
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) , -
© 2021 The Authors. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Royal Anthropological Institute
A reasonable negotiation? 3
incompatibility between salary rises and company viability and to understand himself,
rather than Mopani, as responsible for workers’ ongoing employment. Similarly, union
resources and ideologies enabled Kanda to mitigate decreasing wages’ effects on his co-
workers’ lives, yet encouraged him to justify inadequate salaries to them. Through their
relationships in the workplace and the union, and through the personhoods unionism
helped them to create, union branch executives like Joseph and Kanda performed the
emotional and technical labour of sustaining Zambian capitalism.
This article argues that adopting moral responsibility for their co-workers’ well-
being inspired workplace-based, volunteer unionists to engage in professionalized,
anti-militant relationships with company HR; relationships which facilitated wage
deterioration. In explaining how unionists’ subjectivities influenced Zambian
industrial relations, I am inspired by recent economic anthropology, which explores
political economies through relationships, moral norms, and concepts of self and
community (Bear 2015; Shever 2012). I link these insights to a key contradiction
of contemporary unionism. Unions motivate their members through discourses of
strength, assertiveness, and eventual, righteous victory (Keskula & Sanchez 2019;
Lazar 2017). Yet deregulation and globalization continuously disempower organized
labour, with unions increasingly ensuring employees’ survival through working with
employers instead of confronting them (Durrenberger 2017; Soul 2020). Tying labour’s
enfeeblement to studies that present workplace conditions as emerging from workers’
and their interlocutors’ attempts to create meaningful lives, I explore how unions guide
and enable workers’ personhoods through mitigating, rather than challenging, unjust
labour regimes (cf. Prentice 2015).
The disjuncture between narratives of militant strength and conciliatory daily
practices is particular conspicuous in Zambia. Nationalized mines historically
dominated Zambia’s economy andMUZ created a powerful reputation throughminers’
agitation for decolonization and democratization (Epstein 1958; Ferguson 1999).
Yet the union has traditionally discouraged militancy, working with industry and
government to ensure workers’ dignified livelihoods in exchange for undisrupted
copper production (Burawoy 1972; Larmer 2007). When Zambia’s mines were
privatized in the 1990s,MUZ lostmuch of its influence over working conditions (Fraser
2010). It now increasingly resembles a civic association, brokeringminers’ relationships
with employers, banks, and the community. I therefore explore how junior union
representatives created personal moral projects through acts like organizing loans for
their co-workers and begging for leniency in these co-workers’ disciplinary hearings; as
well as howMUZ reframed these experiences as evidence of union strength. I show that
unionists’ labour, combinedwith structural disempowerment, led to themdiscouraging
the strikes that have sometimes significantly raised miners’ wages.
Through focusing on workplace-based representatives, rather than professional
activists, this article makes two novel contributions to the ethnography of trade
unionism. I demonstrate that drawing strength from a union’s ideology encourages
discounting that ideology’s weaknesses (cf. Lazar 2017; Werbner 2014); and I show
how intra-workplace, tangible solidarities can inspire anti-militant political action (cf.
Harvey 2001; Zlolniski 2019). Recent anthropology explores unionism through ethical-
political projects, in which union leaders cultivate self-mastery and empathy (Lazar
2013;Werbner 2014). Unionists embed their personal disposition for leadership within
shared idealized histories, kin-like relationships, and proscriptions for social change
(Keskula & Sanchez 2019; Lazar 2017). To respond to unionism’s inherent difficulties
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and setbacks, these leaders obtain strength through drawing uncritically from their
union’s ethical-political project. There are important variations between how theorists
conceptualize unionist self-making and political action,3 and I draw primarily from
Lazar’s (2017: 5-13) concepts of ‘containment’ and ‘subjectivation’. ‘Containment’ is the
process through which a unionist becomes encompassed within a collective ethical-
political self – the union – by accepting shared political philosophies and kin-like social
support. This containment enables ‘subjectivation’: a self-discipline taken unreflectively
fromunion-derived ideologies and deployed duringmoments of hardship. Lazar (2017)
witnessed union activists use subjectivation to insulate themselves after an electoral loss,
enabling the personal sacrifice required for political resistance. In contrast, I observed
Zambian unionists’ subjectivation to MUZ’s technocratic ethical-political project, even
when (during wage negotiations) this project’s inconsistencies were most visible and its
impacts most detrimental.
In detailing the hardships that encouraged workplace-based unionists’
subjectivation, I explore how these unionists’ anti-militant ideology was shaped
by caring for their co-workers. Ethnographies commonly follow passionate activists,
who attempt to forge alliances between unions, civil society organizations, and
left-wing political movements (Collins 2012; Werbner 2014). Union leaders hope
that through these alliances, often described as ‘social movement unionism’ or
‘community unionism’, workers and shop-floor representatives will ‘move from
tangible solidarities’ (Harvey 2001: 173) and ‘reach beyond the workplace’ (Moody
1997: 207; see also Waterman 1993). This activism is dichotomized against anti-
militant ‘business unionism’, which focuses upon serving members’ daily needs, and
which scholars frequently attribute to union leaders’ corruption, cowardice, or un-
ideological pragmatism (Zlolniski 2019). Mollona rightly notes that resisting global
capital entwines the practices of business and community unionism. However, he
argues that community unionism requires un-ideological workers and junior unionists
to look past workplace relationships and towards political change (Mollona 2009: 660).
I show instead that workplace-based unionists forged their moral projects through
assisting their co-workers and argue that an ethical-political project inspired by tangible
solidarities resonated with their sacrifices. In this article, I describe Zambia’s low-wage
political economy; then explore unionists’ encompassment within a technocratic,
anti-militant ethical-political project; and then recount how subjectivation to union
ideology impeded negotiating higher wages. I conclude by arguing for a reconsideration
of the relationship between unionists’ motivation and unions’ ideologies, and for
ethical-political projects that reach ‘through’, rather than ‘beyond’, the workplace.
Zambia’s political economy of industrial relations
Zambia’s mining unions have long attempted to represent workers’ demands while
tempering militancy (Larmer 2007). However, their decreasing ability to protect wages
has encouraged accusations that they stifle mobilization and imbricate themselves with
national governments (Uzar 2017). Academics have therefore depicted union leaders
as corrupt (Lee 2018: 140) and described mining unions as ‘collapsed, institutionally
and ideologically’ (Fraser 2010: 18). These studies under-emphasize the workplace-
based branch executives, who (rather than national leaders) explain and justify Zambia’s
industrial relations to miners and attempt to limit wage deterioration’s effects on
workers’ livelihoods. Zambia, like many Global South nations, attempts to attract
international investment through externalizing costs onto workers, their families and
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communities (Fraser 2010 onZambia; Prentice 2015 onTrinidad). Its political economy
therefore requires subjectivities that make exploitative markets appear moral (cf. Bear
2015); as well as intra-community relationships that provide resources previously
obtained through employment (cf. Shever 2012). In this context, Zambia’s workplace-
based unionists offer miners financial services and moral support, yet their intra-
personal assistance is intertwined with union narratives depicting working conditions
as market-determined. I now briefly describe Zambian mining unions’ shift towards
electoral politics and business management, before examining how union branch
executives self-justify the reduced militancy this necessitates. This links the article’s
exploration of unionists’ lived experience to Zambia’s national political economy of
regressive industrial relations laws.
Miners’ militancy precipitated a decolonized, democratic Zambia, while mining
unions have shaped the relationship between the nation’s key industry and
its employees. The African Mineworkers Union (AMWU), the precursor to
MUZ, emerged through workers’ rejection of company-appointed Tribal Elders,
an intermediary chieftaincy common throughout British Africa (Epstein 1958; see
Gluckman, Mitchell & Barnes 1949 on chiefly brokerage). Between 1935 and 1964,
miners struck frequently, linking their material demands to nationalization (Larmer
2007; Mitchell 1969). While AMWU often discouraged strikes, its support enabled
decolonization, and upon national independence in 1964, it was among Zambia’s most
powerful institutions and its miners some of Africa’s wealthiest workers (Ferguson
1999). However, with nationalized mines central to Zambia’s economic future, the
union adopted a conciliatory stance, attempting to balance rank-and-file livelihoods
with its (self-perceived) responsibility to all Zambians (Burawoy 1972). Copper prices
declined for thirty years, reducing income nationwide. Miners’ strikes and political
action then became crucial to democratization and many unionists joined the new
government (Larmer 2007).
Zambia’s 1991 democratization foreshadowed disastrous privatization and
liberalization processes. Over fifteen years, Zambian mines were privatized, collective
bargaining shifted from the industry to enterprise level, subcontracting was legalized,
and the ‘one-union one-industry’ rule was removed (Lee 2018). These changes
decimated the unions and hobbled wages. In 1992, MUZ had 56,482 members, all
permanently employed workers (Uzar 2017). There are now under 20,000 permanent
miners and 60,000 subcontracted mineworkers in Zambia (Kumwenda 2015). MUZ
has 15,652 members, the National Union of Miners and Allied Workers (NUMAW)
has 12,418, and three smaller unions have a combined membership of approximately
5,000. In 1995, miners earnt a minimum monthly basic salary4 of 100,498 ZKM (107
USD). In 2018, permanent miners at First QuantumMinerals (FQM) earnt 1,602 ZKW
(136 USD), while some subcontractors earnt 650 ZKW (55 USD).
Facing decliningmembership and inadequate salaries, Zambian unions use electoral
politics and businesses to maintain their relevance and financial viability. Executives
from MUZ and NUMAW have frequently been elected into government and headed
ministries, including Labour and Mines (Uzar 2017). However, rather than enacting
progressive laws, unionist parliamentarians have focused on organizing financial
assistance when mines are closed, workers subcontracted, or salaries reduced (Larmer
2007; Rakner 2011). Wage reduction has diminished miners’ ability to live off their
earnings and to support the unions through their fees. Unions now work with mines,
running stores that sell miners essential commodities on credit and providing payday
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loans through Bayport, a lender that partners with MUZ. Although unions’ stores
charge 40 per cent above retail prices, their commodities and loans are in constant
demand, with 50-90 per cent of miners having consumption-based debt (Lee 2018).
In 2017, MUZ earnt as much revenue selling mealie-meal as it received through
membership fees.
Unions’ focus on national political office and company-backed businesses has
necessarily reduced militancy. However, it is only through militancy that Zambian
wages and workplace laws have historically improved (Larmer 2007; Rakner 2011).
Copperbelt miners are well positioned to utilize strikes: demonstrating structural
power, their work has a high capital-to-labour ratio and exorbitant shut-down costs;
showing associational power, Zambia’s miner identity is entwined with unionism
(Larmer 2007). Low wage bills have frequently encouraged Zambian mines to quickly
end strikes by raising salaries (Lee 2018). While miners’ energy for militancy is cyclical
(and strikes often fail), industrial action has declined significantly since privatization.
However, above-inflation wage increases only occur during periods of industrial unrest
(Uzar 2017).
Without the threat of militancy, Zambia’s collective bargaining laws favour
employers. While wage negotiations should occur during the final three months of
a collective agreement, management often ignores this timeline. If negotiations are
ongoing at a collective agreement’s end-date, the current contract continues, without
automatic back-pay on any new accord. The only legal directive guiding negotiations
is that both parties should be ‘reasonable’. Reasonableness is undefined, but norms
dictate that degree-holding HR officers admonish uneducated unionists for being
‘unreasonable’, rather than vice versa. If agreement is not reached, negotiations go to
non-binding arbitration. Only after management ignores arbitration’s outcome can a
union petition the court or call a strike ballot. Strike ballots have onerous requirements
and there has never been a legal Zambianmining strike. The 2011 negotiations between
MUZ, NUMAW, and FQM ended in court. Demonstrating Zambia’s labour laws’
inadequacy, the court accepted a government-brokered wage deal, finding that ‘we
cannot and are not expected to determine mathematical [salary] rates’. This process
took ten months and cost each union 500,000 ZKW (80,000 USD). In this context,
companies’ reduced fear of militancy has diminished incomes, with branch executives’
anti-militant activities being crucial to Zambia’s wage regime.
Ever-decreasing militancy, profitable businesses, and a growing distinction between
wealthy union leaders and poor miners has inspired academic criticism of Zambia’s
mining unions (Fraser 2010; Lee 2018). With few exceptions (Larmer 2007), these
works do not unpack the different statuses and subjectivities within each union. Unions
follow a pyramidal structure. Its peak is ‘Head Office’, a ten-member National Executive
Committee (NEC: President, General Secretary [GS], General Treasurer [GT], Deputy
for each [DP, DGS, DGT], and four National Trustees [NTs]) and a small professional
staff. Between 90 and 95 per cent of union funds go through Head Office, which
guides national strategy and interacts with politicians and company executives. At
the pyramid’s base are shop stewards, approximately one per ten to twenty members.
These stewards are miners’ primary point of union contact, but hold little power.
Connecting the two is the six-member volunteer branch executive (Chairperson,
Treasurer, Secretary, and Vices of each) or ‘the branch’, which represents anywhere
between twenty-five and 1,200 members. These branch executives perform significant
unpaid labour: organizing microloans and branch stores, representing co-workers in
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) , -
© 2021 The Authors. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Royal Anthropological Institute
A reasonable negotiation? 7
disciplinary disputes, and scrounging together cash for funerals and school fees. They
also do the work of discouraging militancy, often expending the goodwill they have
generated through assisting members to persuade them to accept below-inflation pay
increments.
During negotiations and shortly after their conclusion, branch officials worked hard
to prevent strikes and go-slows. Many feared that strikes could lead to members being
fired or force the company to pay more than it could afford. However, when talking
more abstractly, the same unionists frequently perceived a need for labour law reform.
When asked aboutmilitancy during or after their negotiations, branch executiveswould
point to the Baluba mine (closed in 2009), and the unstable subcontracting industry as
evidence of what could happen if wages were raised through ‘negotiating with a gun to
their [management’s] head’, or an MP interfering and ‘politicizing’ the process. Shortly
after his negotiation, I asked a chairman who was a significant local politician why the
government supported neither an increased minimum wage nor the right to strike. He
explained: ‘The government cannot do that because they trust the union leaders. It is us
union leaders to negotiate with the companies … There are labour laws that we follow
in Zambia…We believe in the bargaining table’. This narrative, that industrial relations
laws were fair and that salaries reflected market realities, was something almost every
branch official claimed, but only when describing their own wage negotiations.
When removed from the demands of the bargaining process, branch executives
frequently criticized workplace law. Six months before his own negotiations, Joseph
explained:
You can have all the facts you want: all the negotiations go the same way. We say, you are making
money; the company says, we are not. We say, yes you are; they say, no we are not. We say, yes you are;
they say, no we are not. So do what you will. So what can we do? We can declare a dispute, but the
courts here are very slow, so it will mean no increment for five years. We cannot strike because here
we do not have the constitutional right.
Yet Joseph, Kanda, and Richard persuaded themselves that their negotiation was
market-driven and discouraged a slow-down that could have improved their bargaining
position. Their risky document theft and expensive cross-border travel evidenced
that they were not ‘ideologically collapsed’ (Fraser 2010: 17) but were instead deeply
embedded within an ethical-political project. The remainder of this article explores
how branch executives came to understand their own wage negotiations as reflecting
economic realities and to believe that the best way to assist members was to offer
services and discourage militancy. It details how daily life and union training shaped
workplace-based unionists’ engagement with their union’s ethical-political project;
and how the need to draw upon union discourses and relationships during wage
negotiations discouraged considering structural constraints. These processes enhanced
the perceived legitimacy of Zambia’s industrial relations regime (cf. Bear 2015).
The mundanities of trade unionism
In addition to negotiating wages, branch executives worked daily to support miners
as their incomes fell. Theirs was a physically and emotionally demanding role which
encouraged encompassment within their union’s kin-like structures and its ethical-
political project. Yet this daily labour also shaped branch executives’ experiences of
union ideologies. In describing how unionists cultivated leadership through service
provisioning, I demonstrate that their personhoods and moral projects were guided
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as much by tangible solidarities as by political discourse (cf. Keskula & Sanchez
2019; Werbner 2014); and I examine why non-militant ethical-political projects
resonated with Zambian unionists (cf. Zlolniski 2019). I also contribute to literature
which analyses capitalism through workers’ subjectivities and personal obligations,
demonstrating how unionists’ relationships with their co-workers influenced Zambia’s
daily labour regime (cf. Prentice 2015).
Being shimaini – literally a miner in ciBemba – was an emic middle-class identity, a
culturally situated structure of feeling that embedded personal aspirations and intra-
communal obligations (cf. Kasmir & Carbonella 2008). Mineworkers would frame
their purchases and bemoan their expenses through statements like ‘We miners, we
are supposed to be the middle class’. They drew upon an imagined history, where
their antecedents imported European cars and suits (Burawoy 1972; Ferguson 1999).
They linked this history to remittances to, and distinction from, their ‘villager’ kin,
involvement in civic associations, and purchases aimed at ensuring their family’s
advancement, or at least dignity, as the economy worsened (Haynes 2017). Being
shimaini meant placing children in private schools, investing in pensions and life
insurance, and playing an active (and expensive) role in one’s church, all while
supporting rural relatives (Mususa 2014). Shimaini obligations were unachievable
on miners’ wages5 and, as is the case elsewhere in the Global South, the interplay
between their workplace regime and social relations both reshaped and reflected
miners’ subjectivities (cf. Prentice 2015). Unions, and particularly branch executives,
were crucial to the stability of Copperbelt employment and sociality (cf. Shever 2012
on familial associations). They facilitated miners’ relationships with company HR,
credit providers, and even occasionally with their families and churches. Through
their own moral projects and through assisting with the projects of their co-workers,
these unionists shaped and enabled Copperbelt capitalism. In their attempts to medi-
ate the grossly unequal disjuncture between workers and managers, unionists wedded
themselves to an ethical-political project aimed at helping miners survive, rather than
challenging, ongoing wage reduction.
Union branch executives’ personal ethical projects centred upon assuming moral
responsibility for workers’ well-being. Key to their subjectivities (and seemingly those
of other unionists – e.g. Botiveau 2017: 165) was self-identification as a leader and
the ability to motivate themselves through a union’s ethical-political project. Werbner
(2014) describes union leadership as knowledge mastery in dialogue with compassion
and humility, where self-discipline is generated through accepting a cause greater
than oneself. Lazar (2017) argues that empathetic leadership is a disposition cultivated
through habit. She claims that this necessitates a theoretical underpinning that guides
and gives political salience to unionists’ actions. Containment, described earlier,
incorporates the mutual support provided by unionists to each other and by union
ideologies. Unionists subjectivated themselves to these ideologies to obtain strength
in the face of hardships. Lazar (2017), Werbner (2014), and others (Collins 2012;
Durrenberger & Erem 2005) have explored overtly political union projects where
unionists cultivated leadership to move past tangible solidarities and agitate for civil
society engagement and social justice. Zambian branch executives similarly habituated
a disposition for empathetic leadership, yet enacted an anti-militant, service-based
ethical-political project.
Studies frequently treat bread-and-butter service provisioning, and the unionists
who perform it, as un-ideological or as co-opted by government or employers. Business
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) , -
© 2021 The Authors. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Royal Anthropological Institute
A reasonable negotiation? 9
unionism andmember serving is sometimes understood to be an apolitical but humane
goal, where focusing on the particularities of one’s workplace inhibits considering
social change and structural injustice (Harvey 2001; Mollona 2009). More commonly,
service-provisioning unionists are depicted as cowardly or corrupt, reducing militancy
to enrich themselves at workers’ expense (Lee 2018; Moody 1997; Zlolniski 2019).
Such depictions disregard the personal sacrifices of workplace-based union executives
and shop stewards, who assist members for little or no material reward.6 I argue that
Zambia’s workplace-based unionists habituated a disposition for empathetic leadership
through the daily fulfilment of an ideology that framed members’ loans as evidence
of union strength and reduced militancy as professionalism. Rather than discouraging
politicization, tangible solidarities with their co-workers gave union branch executives
the fortitude needed to struggle for social change. However, it was through assisting
these co-workers that they both conceptualized societal improvement and expended
the strength that political activity requires.
An ethos of member servicing
Passionately contested union branch elections occurred every four years. Those elected
were typically civic and community leaders, including scoutmasters, church elders, and
aspiring politicians. Branch executives were rarely re-elected.7 Their constant churn
meant that unionismwas learnt through daily practice, before receiving formal training,
with branch executives drawing upon their pre-existing leadership experience when
assisting their co-workers.
Union branch executives were constantly reminded of their importance to workers’
well-being and class identity. Branch chairmen’s official role was informing miners
about management’s decisions and representing workers to HR. They read out
announcements, navigated administration, and helped members with disciplinary
appeals. However, chairmen spent at least asmuch time facilitating their branch’s union
stores and organizing loans and assistance for miners. Unionism consumed branch
executives’ home lives. Kanda was on Mopani’s internal speed-dial, meaning any of
Mopani Kitwe’s 4,000 employees could phone him by pressing ‘7’ on a Mopani phone.
He constantly received calls, sometimes a miner enquiring about their disciplinary
dispute, or complaining about the lack of maize in their branch store. Much more
commonly, someone needed financial assistance to fulfil their daily needs or familial
expectations. Examples included 100 ZKW (9 USD) for a daughter’s school excursion,
60 ZKW (5 USD) for bus fares to hospital for an ailing spouse’s relatives, and any spare
cash for a sibling’s funeral. There were never enough branch funds for everyone and
Kanda would offer his own money, and ask MUZHead Office, before ultimately failing
to help many members.
A good relationship with HR enabled branch executives to materially assist miners
and to minimize their co-workers’ chance of dismissal; and interactions between
unionists andmanagement encouraged the former to empathize with the latter. Almost
every branch ran a store where members and their spouses could buy essential items
on credit. These stores were the only way many mining families obtained food,
soap, and cooking oil, and ensuring a well-stocked shop was a core task of branch
executives. Union branches also brokered miners’ loans, negotiating mortgages with
banks and emergency credit with payday lenders. Some of the most active chairmen
facilitated partnerships with private pension funds, life insurers, or specialist savings
providers for children’s tertiary educations. All these services were expensive, but they
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were many miners’ only reliable sources of commodities, savings, and credit. They
were made possible through payroll deductions from members’ future salaries, which
reduced default rates. HR periodically disallowed this when it believed a branch was
‘troublesome’.8
Branch executives handled disciplinary cases’ final appeals. Rather than arguing over
the details of an infraction, or of Zambian labour law, they would typically beg HR for
leniency. Branch chairmen would establish rapport with management though phrases
like ‘you know miners’ and accept moral responsibility for correcting the worker’s
behaviour. Absenteeism was rampant among lower-paying subcontractors. One HR
officer claimed that instead of dismissing everyone who committed a fireable offence,
she fired a few absentees per month and overtly considered her relationship with
each union’s branch executives when determining whom to let go. HR and chairmen
would affirm each other’s reasonableness, while working together to train members on
‘financial management’, ‘hygiene’, or even ‘marital harmony’.
Most branch executives were not significantly wealthier than other miners, and
many who worked for subcontractors earnt under 1,500 ZKW (126 USD) a month.
There were nevertheless advantages to union positions. Branches had average monthly
budgets of 3,000 ZKW (257USD)9 and larger branches had cars. Executives used union
funds to pay themselves 50-200 ZKW (4-17 USD) attendance fees for two to three
monthlymeetings andwould occasionally lend themselves emergency funds. Unionists
whom management did not consider ‘troublemakers’ would often find places at their
mine’s selective low-fee school ‘opened up’ for their children after about six months
(most considered this unionism’s biggest perk).10 Union Head Office supported the
campaigns of the approximately 10 per cent of branch executives who ran for minor
political office, regardless of their party allegiance.
More than material benefit, branch executives felt rewarded through being
recognized as leaders in the mine and community. A young branch treasurer
proudly described being called ‘honourable’ by older miners and ‘top tres [treasurer]’
affectionately by his age-mates. A chance meeting with a member would lead to Joseph
being introduced to an entire family aswachair,11 and themember’s spouse and children
queuing to shake his hand.Kanda’s church often prayed thatGod guide himas he helped
their community. Illustrating the tension between their elevated status and financial
precariousness, a chairman and I went to a bank to monitor workers’ pensions. While
we waited in the boardroom, the receptionist gave us freshly cooked steak. Later that
afternoon, the chairman discreetly entered a payday lender and obtained a 500 ZKW
(43 USD) salary advance, to be repaid as 650 ZKW (55 USD) at month’s end.
Because workers’ dignity faced ongoing assaults, miners abused branch executives
as often as they praised them. Accepting this abuse was key to the emotional labour
of unionism. Executives would be constantly consoling members who were unable to
fulfil their middle-class obligations. However, workers would also slander unionists
after being disciplined by management, or humiliated by borrowing money from a
spouse’s parents. Occasionally, a chairman would intercede in a family or church
dispute, embarrassingly assuring a member’s relatives that wages were inadequate after
the miner had been accused of parsimony. Denigrating a branch chairman who could
neither provide financial assistance nor influence management was a consequence-free
outlet for workers, who would have been charged if they abused HR.
Members’ abuse cemented branch executives’ self-perception as leaders, confirming
that they (like HR) had a ‘reasonable’ temperament that ‘miners’ did not. Joseph
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claimed that members’ abuse was interdependent with the community’s acceptance of
his leadership, stating ‘they can only abuse me because they know how to address me
… they know I am chairman’. Another chairman described his emotional labour:
This job is tiring; every day I sort out problems…Members complain about me whenever things are
bad … When they are caught drunk or when management is difficult … [But] I am party to many
decisions that make this place so positive … This makes me proud to be a chairman.
Through their attempts to ensure miners’ well-being and through their co-workers’
praise and denigration, branch executives entrenched their habitus as empathetic
leaders. Through organizing loans and stores, begging for leniency for disciplined
members, and accepting abuse when their assistance failed, these unionists shaped
miners’ experiences of Zambian capitalism. Their labour necessitated containment in
an ideology assuring themof the righteousness of their actions and a theory of how these
actions improved society. The experience of caring for their fellow workers provided
branch executives with strength for their substantive self-sacrifice and predisposed
them to anti-militant ethical-political projects.
An ideology of professionalism and recruitment
Belying depictions of apolitical business unionism (see Fraser’s [2010] depiction
of MUZ), Zambia’s mining unions held ethical-political projects. Through using
businesses and political influence to assist mining communities, the unions would
recruit more members, creating a virtuous cycle where the union grew stronger,
and could mitigate the effects of economic liberalization on miners, Copperbelt
residents, and rural kin, and, thereby, all Zambians. This ideology responded to the
constraints of Zambia’s political economy, even while inadvertently entrenching these.
It contextualized branch executives’ labour and their self-perception as technocratic,
empathetic leaders, while overstating the power of the unions they represented.
Newly elected branch officials received union training after about six months.
MUZ’s Head Office provided a day-long syllabus, which began with union history. This
described how ‘in the past we [miners] threw stones [during strikes]’ and provided
a narrative of growing professionalism. It observed that, among the mining unions,
MUZ had themost former executives asMPs and the largest business portfolio. History
was followed by lessons on safety and disciplinary disputes. These were co-taught by
company HR and overtly positioned the unionists as morally responsible for anyone
fired. An HR officer explained:
One of the biggest issues we have is to change the mind-set of our workers, isn’t it? For me, to do your
job well means that everyone stays in their job … You will be shown to be the best union branch on
record by having no one fired … But to do this you must change people’s mind-sets.
Training concluded by describing collective bargaining, which was presented as a
market-driven partnership with management. The branch should create a research
dossier combining information about the company, the copper price, and the cost of
living. This would enable them to ‘bring percentages that the company is able to pay’
to negotiations. HR would respond to this by ‘making sure they give what they [the
company] can afford’. Training ended with a story about a union branch which came
to negotiations with statistics proving that they deserved an 8 per cent increment, to
which HR agreed immediately. After the story, the trainer provided a hand-out entitled
‘Do’s in Collective Bargaining’. This was a list of bullet points including ‘concentrate’,
‘observe aggressively’, and ‘watch your body language’.
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Unionists’ daily actions were positioned within a national political project through
whole-union events, including quadrennial Head Office elections. MUZ’s national
executive election involved three days of songs, speeches, and stories of the union’s
infallibility. The proceedings began with a rousing chorus of ‘Twikatane-umu-yayaya’
(‘Solidarity Forever’ in ciBema). After this, MUZ’s President orated, celebrating the
union’s strength. His speech labelled branch executives’ labour ‘recruitment’, and
stated that ‘recruitment is the main and key activity of the union and its primary
existence’. Through offering loans, begging for leniency in disciplinary disputes,
and providing small cash gifts, branch executives were recruiting members (who
would have otherwise joined another union) and were therefore strengthening
MUZ.12
Each union’s political project focused on using recruitment to become ‘stronger’
and leveraging this strength to mitigate worsening working conditions, which were
presented as inevitable. During MUZ’s election, Head Office gave speeches identifying
the threats of mechanization, casualization, and decreasing wages. In response, MUZ
had opened a maize mill and further recruitment would fund future businesses, with
economies of scale reducing prices for members, Copperbelt residents, and eventually
all Zambians. These businesses would also make MUZ financially independent of
members’ dues, as new technologies rendered miners redundant. Recruitment would
simultaneously enhance MUZ’s gravitas, enabling it to persuade the government to
finance development projects in mining communities and to provide assistance to
retrenched miners (achievable patronage rather than changing labour laws). MUZ’s
2018 GS’s report claimed credit for government payments to retrenched miners in
Chambishi.
Parliamentarians and businesspeople spoke at MUZ’s elections. Their speeches
foregrounded the anti-militant characteristics of the union’s ethical-political project,
while affirming MUZ’s success. In 2018, MUZ’s maize mill’s manager explained
that the company relied upon subsidized maize, unsubtly discouraging conflict with
government. After this, theMinister for Labour claimed partnership withMUZ, overtly
discounting any need for structural change. She stated:
The Zambian labour laws have been looked at by my colleagues in other countries as very fair, but we
Zambians have not been taking advantage of them…We need to learn to interpret the financials …
Theworld hasmoved.We can’t act like our parents [by striking], so you need to convince the company
on reasoning…We are aware that you have minimized strikes, which shows you have improved your
grievance-handling skills…Yourmembers deservemore than salary increments; they are looking for
‘empowerment’. That is more beneficial to them … Loans to encourage them to own a home before
they retire.
She was followed by Zambia’s High Commissioner to Ghana, a formerMUZ President,
who declared: ‘Productivity! When you produce, you create the capacity to negotiate.
When you do not produce, you create no capacity to negotiate’. MUZ’s GS thanked
the parliamentarians and promised to work with the branch executives, ensuring that
they provided more loans to ‘empower members’ and learnt to ‘interpret the financials’
during negotiations.
As Zambian branch executives’ containment necessitated confidence in the union’s
ethical-political project, dissent was rarely tolerated. Negative posts were deleted from
the whole-union WhatsApp group, and those posting them were suspended. During
union meetings, branch executives would shout ‘Point of order!’ if they believed that a
peer was questioning Head Office’s wisdom or union strategy. MUZ’s DGS explained to
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me that preventing dissatisfaction and celebrating the union’s strength were necessary
to maintain the solidarity that motivated unionists, while branch chairmen said that
they found criticisms of Head Office disrespectful of their own sacrifices. This near-
unquestioning acceptance of a union’s ideology as key to unionism’s effectiveness can be
seen as an explication of containment in an ethical-political project and subjectivation
to it to obtain strength. Based on other union ethnographies, intolerance for dissent is
found among many unions (Botiveau 2017: 1-6; Durrenberger & Erem 2005: 153-9)
and in what Lazar (2013: 120) describes as ‘the practices of solidarity that are common
to unions everywhere’.
Like the workers and families described by Shever (2012), Zambian unionists,
miners, and Copperbelt residents shaped local capitalism through intersecting
subjectivities. Branch executives fulfilled their self-perception as leaders by offering
loans and pleading with HR, creating a workplace where miners could (partially)
fulfil their class-based identity (cf. Prentice 2015). Their anti-militant ethical-political
project responded to (and overtly denied) the union’s weakness, enabling branch
chairmen to mitigate the effects of capital’s empowerment on miners with whom they
shared a tangible solidarity, even as they reduced the likelihood of militancy. However,
containment within this ideology discouraged reflection upon the union’s methods and
its relationship with political structures. Nowhere was this more apparent than with
unionists’ subjectivation during wage negotiations.
Subjectivation and subjectivity in wage negotiations
As foreshadowedwhen describing Joseph’s interactionswithMopani, branch executives
were most fully contained within their union’s ethical-political project during wage
negotiations. Mirroring Lazar’s (2017) understanding of subjectivation, these unionists
drewupon their self-conception as leaders, their relationshipswithHRandHeadOffice,
and the negotiating techniques they had learnt in training to makemeaning of weeks of
isolation, hard work, and an inevitable failure to substantively improve their friends’
and co-workers’ salaries. Where Lazar (2017) and Werbner (2014) show unionists’
submission to a collective ethical-political project driving national political change, I
demonstrate that in Zambia this submission entailed a reduced scrutiny of negotiating
structures, inadvertently diminishing wages.
There is little anthropological literature on wage negotiations. Ethnography
occasionally follows professional unionists, who attribute collective bargaining
outcomes to unions’ decreasing structural power and to management’s superior
technical knowledge (Botiveau 2017: 109-11; Lee 2018: 81-2). Such studies frequently
recount company representatives positing an incompatibility between raising salaries
and maintaining employment levels, but do not investigate the implications of this
trade-off for workplace-based unionists (Durrenberger & Erem 2005; Lazar 2017: 117).
In this section, I explore how negotiation’s physical and emotional demands made
threatening lay-offs a particularly effective tactic within Zambian industrial relations. I
draw upon Ho’s analysis of markets through the subjectivities of key actors, where she
describes Wall Street bankers who ‘legitimized their work and its effects by appealing
to their own work ethic … [Their deals] must be good because, well, they work so hard
on them’ (2009: 106-7).
For Zambian unionists, wage outcomes were similarly made moral through the
labour of negotiations, with hard work both being evidence of the wage agreement’s
fairness and necessitating subjectivation to their union’s ethical-political project.
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Branch executives’ negotiating strategies reflected their union’s technocratic ideology,
convolved with their daily responsibilities to members and their ongoing relationships
with HR. In exploring how Lloyd, an MUZ branch chairman, experienced two years
of negotiations at a Chinese Non-Ferrous Metals Corporation Limited (CNMCL)
subsidiary, I argue that tangible solidarities and union ideologies taught unionists that
negotiations were successful if they did not end in militancy, even if they achieved
poor wage increments. By embedding these negotiations within the daily practices
of unionism, I analyse them as key moments for challenging or stabilizing a political
economy.
Lloyd became a MUZ branch chairman in 2017. During the preceding two years,
he and his co-workers had received 0 per cent increments on monthly wages of less
than 1,200 ZKW (104 USD), despite CNMCL spending approximately 3 per cent of
its total outlay on direct staff costs and making a 11.8 million USD annual profit.
Workers’ dissatisfaction had caused MUZ and NUMAW to hold branch elections
and Lloyd had run a populist campaign, accusing the former chairman of corruption
and promising outlandish pay rises. Despite this, he had a tertiary education and
considered himself a technocratic leader. This self-conception was shared across the
unions’ executives, which included two aspiring politicians and a scout master. Union
training’s depiction of negotiations asmarket-and-research-driven had inspired them to
askCNMCL for an increment of 2,500 ZKW(260USD). To support this claim, they had
produced a document explaining that salaries of 3,700 ZKW (383 USD) were below the
industry average for permanentmineworkers and the cost of living. Evidencingworkers’
contribution to CNMCL’s health, they had photocopied an all-staff memo stating that
production targets had been beaten. When they showed their arguments to NUMAW’s
DGS, he admonished their ‘unreasonable’ requests. He suggested instead asking for
1,000 ZKW (103 USD) and stressed the need to manage miners’ expectations: ‘You are
new leaders, no? Did you come into power by denouncing your former compatriots?
Did you promise your members more? …What will happen now if you promise them
2,500 ZKW and can only deliver 300 ZKW?’ Later, MUZ’s GS called Lloyd to remind
him that the negotiations were confidential and suggested that he avoid members until
they concluded.
Negotiations were scheduled to begin two days later, and the branch executives
distanced themselves from members. However, management delayed meeting for
another three weeks.When negotiations commenced, CNMCL’s Zambian HRmanager
and Chinese director detailed the company’s economic fragility and explained that
they could not increase salaries. They claimed that the kwacha’s diminishing value was
reducing profits, that the government had removed their energy subsidy, and that they
had no market for sulphur, copper production’s primary bi-product. Each night, the
branch executives planned their negotiation strategy and each day NUMAW’s DGS
spoke on their behalf. Lloyd found a CNMCL annual report stating that the only
impact of the kwacha’s devaluation was an 11 per cent reduction in CNMCL’s USD
wage bill. Executives compiled shopping lists demonstrating increased living costs.
Negotiations continued as a back-and-forth of offers and statistics. HR acknowledged
workers’ growing expenses and apologized for their ‘mathematical error’ regarding the
weakening kwacha. However, they could not find a sulphur buyer, preventing any pay
rise.13 Members desired negotiation updates, but Lloyd avoided their calls. He instead
bonded with Head Office staff, who sympathized with him, bought him dinner, and
advised him to ‘take plenty of notes’.
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After three weeks, HR gave the unions two options: they could increase the transport
allowance (30 ZKW/3 USD monthly) or could accept the union’s demands (1,000
ZKW/103 USD), but would balance operational costs by laying off 47 per cent of their
employees. The branch executives were given the evening to decide. While it seemed
unlikely that the company could function without half its workforce, they refused to
gamble with their co-workers’ livelihoods. The next day’smeeting was brief. The unions
would accept a 10% increment (approximately 100 ZKW) if CNMCL did not lay off
workers. The HRmanager declined their offer. She said that if the unions did not accept
0 per cent, CNMCL would declare a dispute, as the unionists were being ‘unreasonable’.
That evening, MUZ’s DGS told Lloyd that he must sign. MUZ would not pay for
mediation and CNMCLmight fire him if negotiations continued. Lloyd was devastated:
he was still developing a rapport with members and had been elected promising to
achieve higher wages than his ‘corrupt’ predecessor. He had not spoken to members
since telling them a month earlier that he would demand 2,500 ZKW (260 USD). He
would soon have to explain that he had only increased monthly salaries by 30 ZKW (3
USD). While mulling these concerns, he received constant calls. Responding to one, he
bemoaned: ‘The trouble with you miners is that you will always be asking. I will give
you information and you will ask for more and I will be forced to lie’. The calls became
more frequent (and aggressive) throughout the night.
The next day, it was agreed that CNMCLwould increase the transport allowance and
retrench no workers. The branch chairmen were sent to inform members. They were
instructed to read off a fact sheet detailing CNMCL’s struggles to sell sulphur, without
mentioning its threat of retrenchment. Workers violently abused the chairmen and
shut down the plant. To the unions’ and management’s surprise, the area’s MP quickly
arrived. She requested that a specific allowance be converted into salary (a 35 per cent
pay rise) and that no one be disciplined for striking. CNMCL’s CEO agreed and the
MP addressed the striking workers. She also obtained Lloyd’s phone number for future
communication.
CNMCL’sHRmanager blamedMUZ for the shut-down, creatingwhat she described
as ‘a period of difficulty’ between Lloyd and herself. While no one was fired for striking,
over the next six months nearly thirty MUZ members were dismissed and were not
reinstated despite Lloyd’s appeals.While performing union duties, the branch staff were
charged with loitering. HR did not allow MUZ to open a branch store and rejected its
Bayport loans partnership. A quarter of MUZmembers then transitioned to NUMAW.
Desiring reconciliation, HR suggested that MUZ co-ordinate the company’s
Christmas hampers. Lloyd earnt 55,000 ZKW (5,700 USD) for Head Office by buying
eggs, chicken, and peanut butter wholesale and charging CNMCL retail prices. Lloyd’s
efficiency pleased members, and his status improved further when HR revoked the
firing of a miner who had absented himself after falling sick. HR allowed workers to
obtain Bayport loans. Bayport then sponsored the MUZ branch secretary’s wedding, at
which the HRmanager was the guest of honour. One-third of workers undertook loans
and many returned to MUZ.
In 2018, CNMCL’s semi-annual report predicted a 131.4 million USD profit. As
in 2017, branch executives created a dossier combing this with information about
industry-average wages and living costs. They planned to ask for 35 per cent, but would
consider 20 per cent a successful negotiation. The firing of workers, harassment by
management, and Head Office training had convinced most branch executives that the
previous year’s strike signified their failure and that it was crucial that ‘the union, not
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the workers, secure the increment’. Lloyd was conflicted. As an entry-level employee,
the strike had increased his salary by 30 per cent. However, he had represented many
miners who had been dismissed since this shut-down and many others whom he had
saved after reconciling with HR. Lloyd maintained secret contact with the area’s MP
and they agreed that he would not sign below 20 per cent. This would create a work
stoppage and she would intervene.
While negotiations again began several weeks late, improved relations between
management and unionists created a cordial atmosphere. This time the HR manager
explained that CNMCL could not offer a pay rise because its record profits must
reward shareholders. The union andHR again spent three weeksmaking counter-offers
and contesting each other’s statistics. The branch staff spent each night attempting
to disprove management’s arguments, while avoiding contact with the members they
desired to help. During negotiations, HR would question unionists’ technocratic
acumen.When the unions suggested three annual ‘school fees’ allowances of 500 ZKW
(51 USD), HR incredulously asked, ‘Do you even know what that would be as an
increment? It could be 35 per cent!’ (It was 4 per cent of the wage bill.)
During proceedings, HR and Head Office empathized with the branch executives
about negotiations’ gravity. They stressed that the companywas like a family and that the
negotiators were the household heads. Together theymust makemembers ‘understand’
the need for low wages. Over lunch, HR asked Lloyd whether she should be lenient
in specific disciplinary cases, overtly juxtaposing his competing responsibilities for
daily well-being and for improving salaries. Once, while driving myself and the branch
executives home, the HRmanager implored, ‘We know that we both want to do what is
best for our workers, but please do not close the company’.
After three weeks, negotiations were deadlocked. CNMCL was offering 6 per cent
(about 80 ZKW/8USD) and the union was demanding 30 per cent (about 320 ZKW/32
USD) and three annual payments of 500 ZKW (51 USD). The HR manager said that
she would take this demand to CNMCL’s directors, but that:
We must be directed by the union. If people here want 500 ZKW and they want this increment, then
we can bring it, but we will have to lay off workers. You know this because of the pressures on the
company. We can do the maths. If you want too much, it must come from somewhere, so we can do
this together, because we are partners. You tell us how to proceed and who to lay off.
The branch executives were given a week to consider the offer, without consulting
members.
Over the next few days, with Head Office’s guidance, the branch executives decided
to accept 6 per cent. However, HR convened an emergency meeting. Rumours that
the union were signing an unjust wage agreement were circulating, which caused a
go-slow. The CEO would offer 8 per cent if the union accepted and briefed members
immediately. MUZ’s DGS cautioned the branch chairmen to be firm with workers so
that the MP did not come and ‘politicize things’. I discreetly asked Lloyd if he planned
to call the MP, as they had received under 20 per cent. He explained that involving the
MP would falsely signify that the union had failed, when 8 per cent was an excellent
result.
The CNMCL employees I knew socially were disappointed but did not consider
striking. Lloyd’s ability to facilitate loans and defend disciplined miners made him
popular. This contributed to members interpreting the branch executives’ multi-week
disappearance and fatigued demeanour as evidence that the negotiations had been hard
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and fairly fought. One worker explained that he was upset but that ‘everyone on the
bargaining table agreed that management had reasons for their decision’. The branch
executives considered the negotiations a success: they had increasedwages by 100 ZKW
(10USD)without endangeringworkers’ livelihoods. TheNUMAWtreasurer explained:
‘This 8 per cent, we can even sacrifice it for the sake of ensuring there is food on a family’s
table [by keeping CNMCL open]’.
Considering CNMCL’s parsimony, 8 per cent was impressive. However, despite
record copper prices and profits, this agreement ensured that workers ended the year
further below the poverty line and the industry average. This obviously contradicted
narratives about the company ‘offering what it could pay’ and wages being determined
by branch executives’ ability to ‘read the financials’. Disputing the limited ethnography
of wage negotiations, CNMCL’s high capital-to-labour ratio and the previous strike’s
success implied that workers had substantive workplace power, while access to data
rendered wage debates (facetiously) technical, impeding the union’s simultaneously
technical and moral claims (cf. Botiveau 2017; Lee 2018). The tension between
wages and employment levels was not an economic barrier, but a tactic utilized by
management (cf. Durrenberger & Erem 2005). As branch-based executives adopted
moral responsibility for workers fired after a strike or who would lose their jobs if
CNMCL closed, this tactic guided them to discourage militancy, limiting a critical
aspect of unions’ negotiating power.
CNMCL’s wage negotiations reflected the interplay between HRs’, unionists’, and
workers’ subjectivities. These interacted with, and de-politicized, legal structures that
discouraged wage growth (cf. Bear 2015). In accepting the outcome of the 2018
negotiations, miners were in part demonstrating their approval of Lloyd as a conduit
for their shimaini aspirations. Lloyd’s popularity reflected his success in representing
disciplined workers and his management of the branch store and loans (which low
wages necessitated). Though their salaries were inadequate, miners represented by
Lloyd could still contribute at funerals, pay school fees, and were unlikely to be
fired.
Understanding Lloyd’s transition to seeing 8 per cent as a success foregrounds
a danger of subjectivating oneself to a union’s ethical-political project. Lazar states
that no collective ethical subject should be considered ‘internally consistent, static or
without contestation’ (2017: 11). However, she also argues that key to subjectivation’s
usefulness is that it enables unionists to be unreflectivewhen experiencing the hardships
of union work, allowing them to persevere by insulating themselves from doubt (2017:
67). In Zambia, this insulation compounded unions’ lack of legal negotiating power,
hidden within their ethical-political projects. Outside the rigours of negotiations, both
Joseph and Lloyd questioned MUZ’s bargaining strategy and their ability to produce
meaningful change without political intervention. However, when isolated from
members and constantly working, these branch executives subjectivated themselves
to their union’s ideology, where technical data, good relations with management, and
‘reasonableness’ would produce the highest salaries that the market allowed. Linking
unionists’ subjectivation to Ho’s (2009) insights on how workplace subjectivities make
economic outcomes ‘moral’, unionists believed that increments they achieved must be
the best, because they had followed this formula and worked so hard. This discouraged
interrogating unions’ ethical-political projects at a key moment of injustice within
Zambian capitalism.
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Conclusion
Lloyd’s, John’s, and Kanda’s attempts to improve their co-workers’ daily lives and to
increase their salaries foregrounded a key contradiction of modern unionism. Unions
motivate their leaders and members through narratives of strength, assertiveness,
and righteous victory, yet unionists’ work is increasingly intermediary, striking
compromises with management to improve workers’ day-to-day lives, rather than their
structural position (Durrenberger 2017; Keskula & Sanchez 2019). This incongruity,
and unions’ disempowerment, can be particularly overt during collective bargaining.
Many unions depict wage agreements as being guided by the skill of negotiators,
constrained by market realities (Botiveau 2017; Lee 2018). However, where strikes
are illegal and neither labour laws nor social contracts compel global companies to
provide fair salaries, the wages agreed will often only satisfy workers’ most basic needs.
Unionists’ support for their co-workers then subsidizes these employees’ survival,
enabling lower salaries; while unions’ linking of service provisioning and wage
negotiations discourages workers from rising up in militant protest.
In Zambia’s mining industry, unions that were crucial to decolonization and
democratization have been decimated by attempts to attract international investment.
These unions increasingly resemble civic associations and reframe their weakness as
professionalism (Fraser 2010). They sell food and financial services to miners; facilitate
leniency in workers’ disciplinary disputes; and negotiate (ever-decreasing) wages
through technocratic discussions about the copper price, shareholder entitlements,
and the cost of living. This article has explored how volunteer, workplace-based
branch executives drew upon union ideology when adopting moral responsibility
for their co-workers’ well-being. I have combined a focus on unions’ structural
weakness with insights from works that conceptualize political economies through
relationships, subjectivities, and moral norms (Bear 2015; Durrenberger 2017). I argue
that unionists’ disposition for empathetic leadership, encompassed within an anti-
militant ethical-political project, diminished wages while enabling Zambian capitalism.
Branch executives guided miners’ middle-class subjectivity through discourses of
technocratic professionalism and through facilitating miners’ relationships with
company management, credit providers, and even their families and churches (cf.
Prentice 2015; Shever 2012). Union discourse, combined with the demands of the wage
negotiations, encouraged branch executives to accept a trade-off between increasing
salaries and laying off co-workers (cf. Ho 2009). Seeing their negotiations’ outcomes
as just, they then leveraged their popularity to discourage strikes, reducing workers’
bargaining power within the national political economy (cf. Bear 2015).
In investigating junior unionists within an anti-militant ethical-political project, I
provide important caveats to recent advances in the anthropology of trade unionism.
Ethnography rightly celebrates unionists who draw uncritically upon union ideologies
and histories as they engage in political action that creates substantive change
(Lazar 2017; Werbner 2014). However, Zambian mining unionists encompassed
themselves in a political project aimed at mitigating, rather than challenging, the
power of liberal capital. Reflecting common forms of unionist self-motivation,
their labour was embedded in narratives of solidarity, strength, and righteous
victory, with little tolerance for dissent (Keskula & Sanchez 2019). This victory
would occur through ‘recruitment’, where a larger union would offer cheaper,
better goods and services, and would pressure the government for more financial
assistance. Recruitment would enhance the quality of life of miners, Copperbelt
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residents, and rural kin, and eventually all Zambians, even while (market-necessitated)
casualization and mechanization reduced wages. During moments of hardship,
where the unions’ disempowerment was most apparent, the need to draw strength
from solidarity discouraged interrogating this ideology and the unjust capitalism it
legitimized (cf. Lazar 2017). The global weakening of labour encourages studying
how unions can (or already do) enable members to scrutinize their ethical-political
projects while maintaining the enthusiasm that solidarity generates; as well as
how unionists can self-motivate as discourses of union strength become untenable
(cf. Werbner 2014).
I have therefore argued for exploring how unionists’ motivation combines their
tangible solidarities with their union’s ethical-political projects. This is a significant
departure from many studies, which conceptualize member servicing and anti-
militancy as un-ideological or corrupt (Moody 1997; Zlolniski 2019). Tangible
relationships encompassed in union politics encouraged branch executives to co-
operatewith thosewho couldmaterially assist their co-workers (banks, the government,
and employers). Yet this same politics and solidarity (and the free market ideologies
it inadvertently contained) motivated Richard to risk his job by utilizing stolen
documents. Evidencing the potential to be driven primarily by solidarities, as opposed
to discourses of union strength, Kanda consistently lent his meagre savings to any
miner who asked. Future studies should explore how differing solidarities between
unionists, their families, and communities interact with national political structures to
shape, challenge, or mitigate capitalism (cf. Collins 2012; von Holdt 2003). Academics
interested in unions’ role in social change should consider tangible solidarities as an
entry point, rather than a distraction, exploring how unions can reach ‘through’, rather
than ‘beyond’, the workplace (cf. Harvey 2001).
NOTES
This article is part of theWORKinMINING project (https://www.workinmining.ulg.ac.be), which received
European Research Council (ERC) funding under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and
innovation programme (grant agreement no. 646802). Thomaswould like to thankBenjaminRubbers, Emma
Lochery, and Owen McNamara, who read multiple drafts of this article, the JRAI Editorial Team and the
anonymous reviewers, and the many Zambian miners and unionists who made this research possible. The
ideas developed in this article reflect only the author’s view. The ERC is not responsible for any use that may
be made of the information it contains.
1 All informants’ names, but not names of companies or public figures, are pseudonyms.
2 I do not engage with the substantive debate around defining Africa’s middle class (see Southall 2016;
Visagie & Posel 2013). Rather, despite being industrial workers, Zambian miners’ historic wealth and
urbanization mean that they self-conceptualize as middle class and their subjectivities are entwined with
this label (Mususa 2014).
3 Werbner (2014) draws heavily on Thompson’s concepts of class (1971) to describe whole-union
mobilization. Keskula and Sanchez (2019) focus on the affective labour of branch executives, built through
‘sentiments of identification’. For each of these theorists however, union leadership requires self-disciplining
through union ideologies (see Werbner 2014: 39-59; Keskula & Sanchez 2019: 114-16).
4 ‘Basic salary’ represents 60 per cent of full salary; ZKM is pre-debasement kwacha.
5 The Jesuit Centre for Social Research claimed that 4,082 ZKW (405 USD) covered the monthly basic
costs for a Kitwe-based family; annual school fees cost 2,000 ZKW (198 USD) per person.
6 In an important exception, Von Holdt (2003) demonstrates how representing their co-workers under
apartheid inherently radicalized African shop stewards.
7 Under 10 per cent of MUZ chairpersons were re-elected.
8 See the next section.
9 Branches received 5-10 per cent (200-10,000 ZKW) of their union dues.
10 A few chairmen owned mining subcontractors.
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11 Wa is an honorific in ciBebma, so wachair translates loosely to ‘honourable chairman’.
12 NUMAW’s election was almost identical.
13 Acid provided under 4 per cent of revenue.
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Une négociation raisonnable ? Subjectivités des syndicalistes de terrain,
négociation des salaires et quotidien d’un projet éthico-politique
Résumé
Cet article analyse comment, dans un souci de responsabilité envers leurs camarades de travail quant
à leur moyen de subsistance, les syndicalistes ont façonné le capitalisme minier en Zambie. L’auteur
avance que les dirigeants des sections syndicales ont pris conscience que le meilleur moyen de soutenir
leurs collègues était de leur proposer des prestations financières, tout en coopérant avec les ressources
humaines. Dans les négociations salariales, les syndicalistes sont sortis renforcés de cette compréhension,
qui les a encouragés à considérer la baisse constante des salaires comme dictée par le marché, tout en
décourageant un militantisme qui a parfois permis de revaloriser les salaires. À partir de l’anthropologie
du syndicalisme, l’auteur détaille comment les solidarités tangibles sur le lieu de travail façonnent les projets
éthico-politiques des syndicats ; il avance par ailleurs que la subjectivation à travers la ligne idéologique
d’un syndicat peut décourager un examen approfondi des injustices structurelles. Établissant un lien entre
l’ exploration anthropologique du capitalisme à travers les relations et les normes morales et le rôle du
capital dérégulé dans le recul des syndicats, l’auteur affirme que le travail moral, technique et physique des
syndicalistes a involontairement permis la dégradation, bien qu’atténuée, des conditions de travail.
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